2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

6 June 2005

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Summary record of the 7th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 5 May 2005, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. de Zueiroz Duarte ..... (Brazil)
later: Mr. Heinsberg (Vice-President) ..... (Germany)

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

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Dolhov** (Ukraine) said that, regrettably, significant gaps in the nuclear non-proliferation regime had in recent years put the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) under stress and brought its credibility into question. The current Conference must chart a course of action to improve the implementation of the NPT, meet present challenges and close the loopholes in regime. There was a need to build on the results of the historic 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Failure to do so would result in the further erosion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and seriously affect international security and stability. It had been almost 11 years since Ukraine's landmark decision to forswear what had been the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. That decision had been crucial for progress in nuclear disarmament and had been among the factors leading to the successful outcome of the 1995 NPT Review Conference. His Government continued to attach great importance to achieving the universality of and strict compliance with the NPT.

2. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was vital to efforts to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. Ukraine was committed to strict implementation of the resolution and called upon other States to follow suit.

3. His delegation noted with satisfaction the progress made in strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Ukraine had been among the States that had requested the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the summer of 2004 to convene a diplomatic conference to amend the Convention. Slow but steady progress had been made in the universalization of the IAEA additional protocol. An integral part of the safeguards system, the additional protocol was an extremely important tool for sustaining an environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy without the threat of proliferation. The verification role of IAEA must therefore be strengthened. Furthermore, the safeguards system was a prerequisite for the nuclear non-proliferation regime to be effective and credible. His Government was currently completing the domestic legal procedures necessary to bring the additional protocol into force. It actively participated in and strictly abided by all major multilateral export control regimes, which it considered should be further enhanced.

4. Concerning new measures by the international community to prevent nuclear proliferation, Ukraine was seeking ways to expand its involvement in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, launched in 2004, as well as in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which had proved to be very effective. The Group of Eight (G-8) Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction also had much potential for countering negative trends in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. His Government welcomed the progress report by the G-8 members at their Sea Island summit in June 2004 and stood ready to contribute to further development of the Global Partnership based on the experience gained in implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme.

5. His Government called on nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament under article VI of the NPT. Reductions in nuclear arsenals, in particular under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, should be irreversible, and the two nuclear-weapon States concerned should seek to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the presidential nuclear initiatives of 1991 and 1992.

6. The problems in implementing both the non-proliferation and the disarmament clauses of the NPT should be given equal weight. There could be no progress in combating nuclear proliferation without tangible steps towards nuclear disarmament and vice versa.

7. His Government called on all States that had not yet done so to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without delay or conditions, especially the 44 States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force. As regional facilitator of the 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Ukraine would continue to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Conference and urged all States with nuclear capabilities to abide by the international moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. In addition, every effort must be made to surmount the protracted political impasse at the Conference on Disarmament

and to begin negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty.

8. The situation on the Korean peninsula continued to be a cause of concern. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must relinquish its nuclear ambitions, resume cooperation with the IAEA and comply without delay with its obligations under the NPT and its safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the other States concerned must make every effort to resume the six-party talks to resolve the crisis.

9. Legally binding security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by eliminating incentives for pursuing capabilities. The establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had contributed significantly to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and disarmament. Ukraine welcomed the efforts made by the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

10. Enhanced participation by civil society in the work of the NPT was important. His Government supported the working paper submitted by Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden on disarmament and non-proliferation education and called on the Conference to encourage States to implement the relevant recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124).

11. The success of the current Review Conference would depend largely on the Parties' ability to agree on substantive measures to meet current pressing challenges. The Conference must above all ensure that the NPT remained one of the main elements of international peace and security and demonstrate the efficiency of the review process.

12. *Mr. Heinsberg (Germany), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

13. **Mr. Neil** (Jamaica) said that the current Conference provided an opportunity to assess the validity and integrity of the NPT. His delegation shared the disappointment expressed by many others at the continuing lack of any real progress in the multilateral disarmament agenda. Since the 2000 Review Conference there had been a sense that the NPT regime was in crisis. The development of new nuclear weapons and improvements in weapons capability among nuclear-weapon States, the possibility of access by non-State actors to nuclear weapons, the withdrawal from the Treaty of one State party and accusations made against certain countries that they were part of a network of instability had contributed to a heightened sense of insecurity. Some States had also begun to place increased emphasis on the nuclear option for the purposes of self-defence, which jeopardized the delicate balance between disarmament and non-proliferation objectives envisaged by the NPT.

14. A review of the past five years had nonetheless shown a few positive developments: further steps towards universality of the NPT had been taken with the accession of Cuba and Timor-Leste; there had been additional signatories to and ratifications of the CTBT; and agreement has been reached among the Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. Jamaica continued to place emphasis on the role that nuclear-weapon-free zones played in enhancing the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. It commended the Government of Mexico for hosting the first conference of States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in April 2005, which should be given due consideration at the present NPT Review Conference.

15. His delegation was concerned that the three pillars of the NPT — disarmament, non-proliferation and guarantees for the peaceful use of nuclear energy — were not being given equal attention. The grand bargain between non-proliferation and disarmament which had helped to establish the NPT must be adhered to in letter and spirit. The continued development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by a few served only to incite others to challenge their supremacy, thereby undermining the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament. The main burden of responsibility for the situation must be borne by the nuclear-weapon States, which had failed to live up to their obligations under article VI. The predominance of non-proliferation concerns at the expense of disarmament must be addressed. Similarly, the Conference should consider ways to strengthen the disarmament regime through implementation of the NPT. Special group arrangements to support non-proliferation should also be subject to universal,

intergovernmental discussion before being integrated as part of the NPT regime.

16. The preservation of article IV obligations continued to be of paramount importance. In a time of diminishing resources and increased costs of energy, the benefits to be gained through the peaceful application of nuclear energy remained of value to the developing world. Such access should not be denied based on a selective and limited interpretation of events. The role of IAEA in providing the necessary monitoring and verification should be strengthened and respected. For its part, Jamaica had fully adhered to the IAEA safeguards system.

17. The NPT provided the best multilateral framework in which to address the security concerns of the international community. States parties should continue to consider ways in which to strengthen the Treaty based on broadening cooperation and promoting understanding and confidence in the NPT.

18. **Mr. Chowdhury** (Bangladesh) said that his country, which had an impeccable non-proliferation record, was committed to full compliance with the NPT and the CTBT. His Government had unconditionally opted to remain non-nuclear. Its unequivocal commitment to the full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects was based on its constitutional obligation to general and complete disarmament. Bangladesh had also concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including an additional protocol, and was a party to all disarmament-related treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention on Conventional Weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention.

19. His delegation called on all States to implement the 13 steps outlined in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and was concerned at the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States in that regard. His Government regretted the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, whose working methods required a serious review, and urged States to start negotiations in good faith to conclude a non-discriminatory, multilateral and verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

20. Bangladesh welcomed the reduction of nuclear arsenals through arrangements outside the NPT. Such arrangements, however, should complement rather than substitute for the NPT. It was also concerned at the continued development of new, more sophisticated and precise types of nuclear weapons, which increased the likelihood that such weapons would be used. Furthermore, it regretted that the CTBT had not entered into force.

21. Any new measures proposed at the current Conference must avoid limiting the rights of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Treaty.

22. His Government supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all parts of the world, including the Middle East and South Asia and commended the five Central Asian States for establishing such a zone in their region. It also welcomed the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. Bangladesh regretted the frustration of efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East and called on Israel to accede to the NPT immediately and to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards.

23. Bangladesh attached particular importance to the universalization of the NPT. It was encouraged by the decision by India and Pakistan to impose a moratorium on further nuclear testing. Nevertheless, it called on both States to accede to the NPT and submit their nuclear facilities to IAEA surveillance. His Government also welcomed the decision by Cuba and Timor-Leste to join the NPT.

24. Negative security assurances were vital to strengthening the NPT, as they discouraged non-nuclear States to opt for nuclear weapons. His Government therefore called on nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm their commitment to providing negative security assurances, which would greatly promote non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

25. The IAEA safeguards and verification systems, together with technical assistance programmes particularly in the area of health, agriculture, environment and industry, should be strengthened. States parties must ensure that the Agency had the necessary resources to accomplish those tasks. His Government recognized the important role of the civil society organizations in raising awareness and in creating momentum on such vitally important issues and encouraged their continued participation in activities towards achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. It supported the Mayors-for-Peace movement and their vision to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free world by 2020.

26. Because security lay not in making weapons but in making peace through establishing linkages between peoples, Bangladesh had been submitted a resolution every year on the establishment of a culture of peace and recommended that it should be reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General on United Nations reform and that a mechanism in the Secretariat should be established for that purpose.

27. **Mr. Menon** (Singapore) said that the NPT, with its system of integrated safeguards, remained the lynchpin of the global non-proliferation regime and one of the best guarantees for the security of small States like Singapore. It was the only global treaty dedicated to the containment and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

28. The Review Conference must build on the progress made five years earlier and ensure that the NPT remained the best defence against the spread of nuclear weapons. It must also muster the necessary political will to make progress on the 13 practical steps to disarmament and non-proliferation agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, the CTBT and the fissile material cut-off treaty.

29. Compliance with various non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaties, above all the NPT, remained a key priority for Singapore. The IAEA safeguards system should be strengthened and the additional protocol should be adopted as the new non-proliferation standard. States parties that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA should do so without delay. His Government hoped to conclude an additional protocol at the earliest opportunity.

30. His delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rejoin the NPT and abide by its non-proliferation obligations, including full cooperation with the IAEA. The Conference must also explore ways of strengthening the NPT regime's ability to deal with similar cases in the future.

31. Singapore welcomed the commitment by the United States of America and Russia, under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 and encouraged them to accelerate the pace of nuclear disarmament. Singapore had consistently contributed its full assessed share of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund to help to share and spread the benefits of nuclear knowledge. Under the Singapore-IAEA memorandum of understanding on Technical Cooperation, it had also conducted a host of third-country training programmes and other activities in areas such as radiation protection and nuclear medicine.

32. While Singapore supported efforts to help countries reap the benefits of harnessing the peaceful use of nuclear technology it was vital to ensure that non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in relation to peaceful nuclear technology transfer and technical cooperation activities were carried out in strict compliance with international standards on nuclear safety and security.

33. The discovery of a sophisticated and clandestine nuclear procurement network supplying nuclear material, equipment and technology was deeply worrying. It was imperative for States to exercise individual and collective efforts to counter such threats and continue to find ways to enhance international cooperation. Singapore therefore supported full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). While multilateralism should form the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and promote global security, other initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative were important for bolstering ongoing international counter-proliferation efforts. The work of the Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle also contributed to those efforts.

34. Equal weight must be given to all aspects of commitments undertaken by States parties under the NPT. Singapore therefore called for full and non-selective implementation of all three pillars of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT was a key instrument in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote nuclear disarmament and required strengthening to meet the new proliferation challenges.

35. **Mr. Le Luong Minh** (Viet Nam) said that the continued absence of equal treatment of the vertical and horizontal aspects of non-proliferation would only delay the time when the world was free from nuclear weapons. While the non-proliferation regime had been strictly observed by the overwhelming majority of the more than 180 non-nuclear-weapon States, disarmament had not received the same level of emphasis by the nuclear-weapon States. Although those States had undertaken to comply fully with

article VI of the Treaty at the 2000 Review Conference, thousands of nuclear weapons still existed, many on alert status, and negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had yet to resume. Alarming new security doctrines gave an even broader role to nuclear weapons, jeopardizing the authority and relevance of the Treaty.

36. Regrettably, conditions were being attached to the security assurances given by nuclear-weapon States to those States which had voluntarily opted not to acquire nuclear weapons. Early conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be given attention at the Review Conference.

37. The recent conference of members of nuclear-weapon-free zones had reaffirmed the conviction that such zones were an important disarmament measure. It was encouraging to note that over 100 States had signed treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Efforts must continue to implement the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review Conference on establishing such a zone in the Middle East. One of the most important factors determining the effectiveness of the treaties establishing such zones was the signing of their protocols by the nuclear-weapon States. His Government welcomed China's readiness to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok).

38. The peaceful use of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the Treaty, was as important as non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. His delegation shared the concerns over the tendency to apply undue restrictions on exports of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries. While supporting and commending the work of IAEA to ensure compliance, his delegation believed there could be a better balance between its resources for safeguards and those for technical assistance.

39. The Treaty had played a vital role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but its future was at stake. The international community must decide whether to move forward by restoring its relevance or simply to allow the confidence of States in the Treaty to continue to erode.

40. **Mr. Aranibar** Quiroga (Bolivia) said that the Treaty must be strengthened and revitalized by the Review Conference, not only because of changes in nuclear policy by some Powers, the persistent refusal of some States to ratify it and the withdrawal by one State, but also because of the increasing danger that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of non-State actors, in particular terrorist groups. Vertical and horizontal proliferation posed a threat to the survival of all States, big and small, rich and poor, whether or not they had nuclear weapons. Yet the international community had not sufficiently recognized that danger, even though the devastating effects of a nuclear catastrophe were well known.

41. The Treaty was the best instrument available for establishing global monitoring over technological processes with a view to ensuring that nuclear energy was not used in an uncontrolled manner. Yet its potential could not be tapped to the full without the willingness of all States with nuclear technology to promote the broadest possible exchange of scientific research, information and equipment for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

42. The Treaty should be improved and, despite the challenges it was currently facing, should remain the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The Review Conference provided an opportunity for all Parties to reaffirm their political will to continue and consolidate the progress made in 1995, and in particular the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000. Bolivia shared the growing concern at the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which had not been able to reach consensus on a substantive agenda for several years. It welcomed the Declaration of the conference on nuclear-weapon-free zones just held in Mexico and would continue to support all initiatives to establish such zones in every region of the world. With the cooperation of IAEA, it had established the Bolivian Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology.

43. The system of collective security for the twenty-first century required the universality of the Treaty and the early entry into force of the CTBT, as tangible signs of effective multilateralism.

44. **Mr. Castellón Duarte** (Nicaragua) said that the universality of the Treaty was of the utmost importance for the future of the international community; it therefore urged those States which had not done so to accede to the Treaty, and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to rejoin it as a full member.

Nuclear-weapon States must reduce their stockpiles in an effort to discourage proliferation and to move towards the total destruction of all nuclear weapons, the only absolute guarantee of safety. In that regard the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2002 was a major step forward.

45. As a non-nuclear weapon State, Nicaragua called on the nuclear-weapon States to provide adequate guarantees, including the negotiation of a binding agreement against the threat or use of such weapons against States without them. His delegation was also concerned that the CTBT had not yet entered into force, and it called on the States mentioned in its annex II to sign and ratify it without further delay.

46. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) had made a major contribution to the cause of non-proliferation by emphasizing the need to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to weapons technology, nuclear materials and biological and chemical agents. The recent adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also a positive step, and Nicaragua hoped for its early entry into force.

47. In conclusion, his delegation was convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons represented a threat to the survival of humanity and that the only true guarantee against their use or the threat of use was their total elimination.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.